<p>Major General Claire L. Chennault is remembered as a brilliant strategist and tactician. As commander of the American Volunteer Groups, a three-squadron air force that operated from Burma and China, Chennault planned basic tactics for the 'Flying Tigers' that enabled them to score heavily against their Japanese opposition. Then, as commander of the China Air Task Force, Tenth AF, Chennault again showed his special skills. When CATF was absorbed as the nucleus of the Fourteenth Air Force, he was given a single mandate: strike the Japanese wherever and whenever they were found.
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<p>The Fourteenth was a small force, even by Pacific standards. It began with a single fighter group, one bombardment group of heavies and a squadron of mediums, totalling an official 356 aircraft, but with far fewer available for operations When the war ended. the peak strength of Fourteenth AF was five fighter groups, still one heavy bomber group and a single medium bomber group, an authorized strength of 798 aircraft.
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<p>With that relative handful of planes, Chennault defended half of China, protected one terminus of the Hump routes, ferried much of his own supply requirements, and sent offensive missions as far east as Shanghai, as far southeast as Haiphong and as far west as Burma. His fighters and bombers were the only consistent air support force the Chinese armies had.
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<p>Chennault believed that China could be defended by the proper application of air power and he tried his best to get what he saw as necessary. He was promised a buildup of Fourteenth AF strength, but it came too late. He never had enough supplies and often most of the Fourteenth was grounded, out of fuel.
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<p>The Fourteenth also was a tactical force; even its heavies were used in that role. Chennault and his commanders understood strategic bombing but they never got enough aircraft, bombs or fuel to sustain an offensive. The heavies often had to be pressed into ferry service, flying back to India for supplies.
